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How Trade Saved Humanity from Biological Exclusion: 
An Economic Theory of Neanderthal Extinction 
One  of  the  great  scientific  puzzles  is  the  cause  of  Neanderthal  (Homo  neanderthalensis) 
extinction  around  30,000–40,000  B.P.,  when  early  modern  humans  (Homo  sapiens)  started 
spreading across the world.  European Neanderthals are believed to have diverged more than half 
a  million  years  ago  from  the  lineage  giving  rise  to  humans  (Mellars  1998),  and  the  first 
Neanderthal-like creatures appeared around 300,000 B.P. (Gee 1996).  Scientists have long asked 
what explains the species’ sudden demise after such a long existence.  Many anthropologists and 
palaeontologists think it was not a coincidence that the fall of Neanderthals occurred at the same 
time when early humans rose to power.  Homo sapiens are the suspected culprits, but exactly 
how early humans triggered Neanderthal extinction remains unsolved. 
Notwithstanding the appeal of a unified broad theory to explain the demise of Neanderthals, 
the literature suggests that multiple causes may have done the species in and that no single theory 
fits all the available data.1  The core of the current set of theories can be grouped under the 
principle of competitive exclusion (Mithen 1998; Tattersall and Schwartz 2000; Flores 1998) –– 
the principle that, if two similar species occupy the same niche, only the more efficient survives 
and the other slowly goes extinct as they compete for resources (see Flores 1998; McGehee and 
Armstrong 1977).  Efficiency in this context can have a mechanistic biological basis or a social 
or behavioral origin.  Prior models have considered a mechanistic biological origin (e.g., Flores) 
                                                           
1 Neanderthal extinction was a gradual process involving many distinct and isolated populations (Pettitt 1999).  
Factors that might explain some local extinctions may not apply to others.  The literature provides many ad hoc 
theories that may or may not be relevant for certain extinctions.  Some theories are based on human-Neanderthal 
interaction through germs and warfare (Diamond 1992) or competition (Flores 1998), and others suggest humans 
only filled empty niches that arose due to Neanderthal-Neanderthal conflict (Pettitt 1999; Guk 1997).  Aggression 
hypotheses are often discounted since no traces of Paleolithic warfare exist, and because the two species may not 
have even met in many areas due to low population densities (Pettit 1999).  Even if the species did conflict, “this 
would not have been equivalent to the colonial confrontation between Europeans and Indigenous peoples.  There 
…was no shocking disparity in fire power” (Gamble 1999, p. 268).  A hypothesis that the two species “merged” has 




not rooted in behavior or ethology.  By mechanistic, we mean that exogenous forces govern 
population dynamics because, at the micro level, individuals take these forces to be given and 
outside of their control.  For instance, an individual’s meat consumption would be limited by his 
own skills, physiology, and available technology.  Biological efficiency in this context therefore 
captures  the  idea  that  differences  existed  in  exogenous  biological  factors  (as  opposed  to 
behavioral  factors)  like  higher  birth  rates  or  lower  mortality  rates,  and  physiological  or 
technological factors like being better hunters.
2  We refer to competitive exclusion based on 
biological efficiency thus defined as biological exclusion. 
Since early man is still around, biological exclusion theories suggest that man must have 
been more biologically efficient than Neanderthals.  This “just-so” story of biological exclusion 
takes  the  position  that  biology  is  destiny.  But  from  an  economist’s  perspective,  this  strict 
biology-based hypothesis is not completely  satisfactory  for at least two reasons.
3    First, an 
identification  problem  exists.    It  is  impossible  to  determine  precisely  which  biological, 
physiological, or technological differences might have led to the Neanderthal’s demise.  Physical 
differences existed between early man and the Neanderthal.  But few reasons emerge to believe 
the two species were all that different anatomically.  Neanderthals were slightly more squat and 
broad, but each species was strong and clever, and had the ability to develop tools and weapons 
(see Gee 1996, Bahn 1998, Mellars 1998, Bergeron 1999).
4  And even if significant differences 
existed between the two species, science does not know for certain that these differences favored 
                                                           
2 Several theories are based on physical differences.  One thesis is that Neanderthals had a greater instance of fatal 
complications during childbirth due to their larger craniums (Guk 1997).  Another idea is that Neanderthals were 
better suited to a cooler climate and were somewhat less suited than humans to the warmer climates after the glacial 
icesheets retreated.  However, it is incorrect to infer that Neanderthals were best-suited for a cool climate or that 
they were unable to adapt to different climates.  Neanderthals had successfully adapted to several periods of climate 
change, which has led some to discount this theory (Tattersall and Schwartz 2000). 
3 Also see for example Shogren and Crocker’s (1999) discussion on endogenous actions to control risk, and the lack 
of and need for better integration of economics into the biology of environmental risk assessment; and Crocker’s 




early man. Neanderthals supposedly had superior bodily strength and presumably were well-
adapted  to  the  harsh  biophysical  environment  in  which  they  lived  for  thousands  of  years.  
Finally, Diamond (1992) writes that Neanderthals had 10% larger brains than humans, which 
does  not  necessarily  imply  they  were  smarter––although  that  cannot  be  ruled  out.   So  what 
exactly was it about the biology that triggered early human dominance over the Neanderthal? 
Second, the biological exclusion principle is not entirely satisfactory because it is based 
solely on the traits of individual members of a population.  Ever since Darwin, biologists have 
been prone to consider what is beneficial or costly for the individual organism (i.e., its birth and 
death rate, or ability to find food and tolerate stress), not the group of individual organisms.  
Efforts  to  translate  the  theory  of  natural  selection  to  the  group  level  are  often  treated  with 
extreme suspicion, and are believed to stretch evolutionary biology theory beyond reasonable 
limits  (e.g.,  Wynne-Edwards  1962).    This  paradigm  may  have  affected  thinking  about  other 
biological  theories,  like  those  pertaining  to  biological  exclusion.    But  while  the  focus  on 
individuals and the credo “nature does not look forward” (e.g., Eldredge 1995) may be correct 
for non-sentient beings as squirrels, it does not help in understanding the dynamics of human 
society (notwithstanding advances in sociobiology, see chapter 20 in Wilson 1975).
5  Humans 
can  create  and  commit  to  exchange  institutions  that  promote  trade  and  insurance,  and  may 
organize themselves to reap the gains from trade that emerge from the specialization of labor.
6   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 Science no longer views Neanderthals as the retarded brutes they were once thought to be. 
5 Darwin originally concluded that humans must have been exempt from natural selection as is believed to occur in 
the  wild.    Dobzhansky,  who  helped  introduce  Neo-Darwinism,  believed  that  culture  exempted  humans  from 
traditional notions of evolution.  He concluded that culture “precluded the existence of more than one hominid 
species at any point in time.  It just couldn't happen that two species could bear culture” (Tattersall and Schwartz, 
2000, p. 32).  Science now generally accepts that humans are part of the same evolutionary processes as other 
species.  Our paper shows explicitly how culture may be a part of evolutionary and extinction processes. 
6 Specialization and division of labor can also be seen in nature.  For example, specialization in reproduction and 
other tasks is common in colonies of insects (e.g., bees, ants) and marine invertebrates (e.g., corals).  Whether this 
specialization helped these species to exclude other populations that did not exhibit such behavior is unknown.  But 
because the individual colony members are genetically identical (invertebrate colonies) or at least closely related 




This paper re-examines the early human survival and Neanderthal extinction question from a 
social or behavioral perspective, whereby individuals collectively develop ways to overcome 
their  individual  limits—to  make  their  situation  endogenous.    Tattersall  and  Schwartz  (2000, 
p.234) indicate that the key to the problem of coexistence may lie in the “behavioral modernity” 
of  early  humans.    But  no  formal  theories  of  the  precise  behavioral  changes,  either  at  the 
individual or group level, that could have led to Neanderthal extinction have been put forth.
7  We 
consider  how  the  interaction  between  individuals  could  have  caused  the  difference  between 
species survival.  This is based on the notion advanced by Professor Ian Tattersall (personal 
communication)  that  modern  socio-economic  behaviors  are  expressions  of  a  generalized 
underlying capacity that was  recently  acquired  and which  Neanderthals did not have.  As a 
result,  early  modern  humans  experienced  endogenous  economic  advances  that  led  to  more 
products that were more varied and detailed than in Neanderthal and prior human cultures, many 
more  innovations  more  widely  dispersed,  and  vastly  larger  social  networks  than  had  been 
developed by previous cultures (Tattersall and Schwartz 2000; Tattersall et al. 1988; Gamble 
1999).   
Although no single theory is likely to explain all aspects of Neanderthal extinction and 
the archaeological record is too poorly understood to adequately judge the absolute merits of 
every theory, we take an initial step at incorporating behavioral responses to economic stimuli.  
We develop a behavioral explanation of Neanderthal extinction and human survival based on the 
species’ relative ability to capture the gains from trade that arise from the endogenous division of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
evolutionary sense (e.g., Eldredge 1995).  Vertebrate societies rarely display such extreme specialization.  There is 
an increasing theoretical literature on cooperation and evolution (Dugatkin 1997). 
7 In the economic literature, Hansson and Stuart (1990) model the gradual displacement of one group of humans by 
another that behaves economically superior.  They model natural selection of stable individual preferences for labor 
supply and saving, assuming such preferences are heritable traits or passable through learning from parents, and that 




labor.  Our model provides an economic underpinning of the competitive exclusion principle at 
the level of the group, rather than the individual.  We find that the development of rudimentary 
economic exchange institutions—trade and division of labor—could have enabled humans to 
seal the fate of Neanderthals, even if biology was against them initially.
8  
 
I.  Evidence of Neanderthal stagnation and early human trade 
Neanderthals originated about 300,000 B.P. and occupied much of Europe and West Asia by up 
to 200,000 B.P.  To put this in perspective, they survived as a species for longer than humans 
have been around.  The archaeological evidence does not support the concept of division of labor 
and trade, at least not in a meaningful economic way relative to the human groups that followed.   
Gamble  (1999)  classifies  Neanderthal  society  as  complex  –  a  term  he  also  uses  to 
describe baboon societies, at least in terms of their social networks.  Social group sizes were 
relatively limited, consisting of about two-dozen individuals at most, and the living spaces of 
these  individuals  were  largely  unorganized,  with  no  evidence  that  the  spaces  were  divided 
according to different functions (Tattersall and Schwartz 2000).  Tattersall and Schwartz (2000, 
p.212) indicate “…there is little evidence to refute Binford’s notion that the Neanderthal’s lacked 
modern  human  levels  of  forward  planning  and  anticipation.    Certainly,  the  sites  lacked  the 
structure and complexity of those of early modern humans, and it is reasonable to suppose that 
this reflects a fundamental difference in lifestyle.”  Neanderthal technologies did not advance 
significantly  over  their  long  reign,  which  has  been  interpreted  as  evidence  of  a  lack  of 
competition and social interaction (Kuhn and Stiner 1998), particularly inter-group interactions 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to the biological exclusion principle literature as the results are driven by differences in individual characteristics 
distributed in a nondegenerate fashion among homogenous ‘clans’.  
8 The term trade is  used for clarity and convenience.  However trade,  which is typically defined as  voluntary 
exchange, is not necessary for the results we obtain.  Instead, all that is needed is a division of labor and some 




(Gamble 1999).   
This view is also supported by evidence that raw materials were not often transported and 
any  transportation  that  did  occur  was  over  relatively  small  distances  (Gamble  1999).  
Neanderthal  groups  remained  somewhat  isolated,  not  ranging  far  from  home.    They  did  not 
develop  meaningful  trade  links  with  other  Neanderthal  groups  (Gee  1996,  p.36).    Available 
evidence  suggests  that  Neanderthals  probably  cooperated  with  one  another  to  some  extent 
(Gamble 1999), but does not support the view that specialization arose from any formal division 
of labor or that inter- or intra-group trade existed.  These practices seem to require all the things 
that  Neanderthals  lacked—a  more  complicated  social  organization,  a  degree  of  innovative 
behavior, forward planning, and the exchange of information, ideas, and raw materials. 
Early humans originated in Africa over 100,000 years ago, where they remained for a 
considerable time.  About 47,000 years ago, some humans left Africa to settle in the Levant (the 
middle east); about 40,000 years ago, other groups left Africa for the Iberian Peninsula.  Both 
groups are thought to possess similar technologies and social structures (Tattersall and Schwartz 
2000),  although  probably  more  is  known  about  the  Iberian  humans,  first  known  as  the 
Aurignacians and later the Gravettians (Gamble 1999).   
Anthropologists note a major change in society with the advent of humans in Europe and 
Asia.  Gamble states the fundamental difference to be the transition from complex Neanderthal 
societies  to  complicated  human  societies,  which  represent  a  significant  advancement  in  the 
complexity  of  social  networks.    Unlike  Neanderthals,  evidence  exists  that  early  humans 
specialized at least to some degree, and that they engaged in both intra- and inter-group trade.  
They exhibited complex living arrangements in which different sections of the living areas were 




Neanderthals, early humans developed significantly more types of activities with more detailed 
workmanship, and they generated more innovations (Tattersall and Scwartz 2000; Blades 2001; 
Kuhn and Stiner 1998).  All of these features are suggestive of specialization.  Many innovations 
were directly related to food procurement (Kuhn and Stiner 1998).  A key element in Kuhn and 
Stiner’s (1998) analysis is the link between the incentive to develop new technologies and the 
potential  payoffs  from  obtaining  food  surpluses.    Many  anthropologists  have  noted  how 
judicious redistribution of excess resources provides a distinct advantage to “efficient hunters”, 
as  measured  by  currency  like  increased  survivorship,  social  prestige,  or  reproductive 
opportunities.  For instance, it is believed that killing large game became a method of acquiring 
wealth, and that efficient hunters could build up “reciprocal obligations” by exchanging food 
(Mithen 1990).   
Describing early humans, Mithen (1990, pp.219-222) states “there can be little doubt that 
the  Upper  Paleolithic  settlement-subsistence  system…was  logistically  organized  with  high 
degrees of scheduling and forward planning.”   Similarly, Tattersall and Schwartz (2000, p.246) 
conclude that “Aurignacians lived in social groups much more complex and variable in size than 
any earlier groups.  There is good reason to believe that such ‘modern’ socioeconomic features 
such as division of labor and social stratification had already appeared in Aurignacian times.”   
Evidence also suggests travelling bands of early humans interacted with each other and 
that  inter-group  trading  emerged.    Early  humans,  the  Aurignations  and  especially  the 
Gravettians, imported many raw materials over long ranges and their innovations were widely 
dispersed (Tattersall and Scwartz 2000; Blades 2001; Kuhn and Stiner 1998; Gamble 1999).  
Indeed, “…widespread evidence of long-distance trade in stone, ivory, and fossil and marine 




in either the Mousterian [Neanderthals] or the Chatelperronian [Neanderthals]” (Tattersall et al., 
p.64).  Such exchanges of goods and ideas helped early humans to develop ‘supergroup social 
mechanisms’ (Sahlins 1959).  The long-range interchange between different groups both kept 
“culture  going”  (Shreeve  1996;  Gee  1996)  and  generated  new  “cultural  explosions”  (Pfeifer 
1982; Mithen 1998).  And as we show in the following discussion, these intra- and inter-group 
interactions could enable early humans to increase their non-subsistence activities like art, while 
simultaneously out-competing Neanderthals on their joint hunting grounds. 
 
II.   A benchmark model: biological exclusion 
A: The basic model 
As a comparative benchmark, we begin with a mechanistic biological explanation based on the 
principle  of  biological  exclusion.  The  stylised  model  focuses  on  the  key  biological  issues.  
Assume  the  diets  of  early  man  and  Neanderthals  consisted  primarily  of  meat  from  hunting 
(Mosimann and Martin 1975), and they competed for prey.
9   
Imagine a society of humans consisting of M households, and a society of Neanderthals, 
consisting  of  N  households.    Because  our  objective  is  to  compare  this  model  of  biological 
exclusion with one of economic exclusion, where within-group trade arises to exploit differences 
in skills, we go ahead and introduce within-group heterogeneity at this point.  Assume members 
of each population (human and Neanderthal) are in one of two subgroups: (i) skilled hunters 
                                                           
9 There is perfect niche overlap in our model.  It is possible that one evolutionary (or behavioral) response of 
Neanderthals to competition with humans would have been to change niches.  This alternative niche hypothesis does 
not exist in our model; one future extension would be to allow for this through adding alternative food sources or 
adding space (see Flores 1998).  An anonymous referee points out that if the new niche was associated with greater 
fluctuations (as limit cycles, chaos, and other forms of complex dynamics can be part of consumer resource systems) 
than the initial niche which was better-suited for Neanderthals, then even a seemingly minor level of stochasticity 
could drive Neanderthals to extinction.  While biological forces might lead directly to extinction in such a case, the 
end result would actually be precipitated from the behavioral exclusion of Neanderthals from their initial niche.  See 




(indexed by j=s) and (ii) unskilled hunters (indexed by j=u).  Members of each group primarily 
sustain  themselves  by  hunting  and  consuming  wildlife,  and  they  also  derive  utility  from 
‘consuming’ a possibly broad set of other goods (e.g., clothes and shelter).
10  Consistent with 
most of the literature on open access harvesting in primitive societies (e.g. Smith 1975, Brander 




ij ij ij v m U
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1    i = M,N;  j=s,u 
where bi is a parameter that is not assumed to vary by skill-class.  Households maximize (1) 
subject to a time constraint 
(2)   lij = eij + aij, 
where  l  is  the  total  labor  endowment,  e  is  hunting  effort,  and  a  measures  effort  directed  at 
producing manufactures or other goods.  Let v = a for simplicity.  Harvesting of meat is defined 
by the standard Schaefer production function (Clark 1990) 
(3)  mij = qijeijx, 
where  x  represents  the  extant  population  (biomass)  of  wildlife  and  qij  is  the  catchability 
coefficient defining the ease with which wildlife is harvested.  Skilled hunters have a larger 
catchability coefficient than unskilled hunters, i.e., qis>qiu.  The parameter qij may differ between 
Neanderthals and humans due to differences in hunting efficiency (e.g., physiology). 
  We assume individuals solve a series of static labor allocation problems rather than a single 
                                                           
10Wildlife serves as a specific proxy for general biological food resources, although meat was heavily consumed 
during  this  time.  Mosimann  and  Martin  (1975)  argue  Paleolithic  man  ate  little  else  than  meat;  their  point  is 
supported by recent research discussed in O’Neill (2002).  Throughout we assume that both groups have free access 
to wildlife resources, with neither group excluding the other’s access.  See Baker (2003) for an analysis of land 
tenure in hunter-gatherer societies.  Also other goods could include weapons, which would be intermediate inputs 
into  the  hunting  production  function.    We  do  not  model  these  intermediate  inputs;  we  point  out  the  human 
specialization  in  these  inputs  –  particularly  specialization  that  leads  to  technological  change—would  serve  to 




dynamic  optimization  problem.
11    This  presumption  is  consistent  both  with  Mithen’s  (1990, 
p.224) observation that “hunter-gatherers do not appear to plan subsistence activities over time 
scales longer than one year” and with open access resource exploitation (Conrad 1995, Brander 
and Taylor 1998).  Substituting expression (3) into (1), the Lagrangean for an individual of skill 
level j belonging to population i is 
(4)  ] [ ) (
1
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij a e l a xe q L
i i - - + =
- l
b b . 
Solving the problem yields optimal meat consumption,  
(5)  x l q m ij i ij ij b =
* ,  
which  is  greater  when  prey  is  easier  to  catch,  the  appetite  for  meat  is  greater,  the  labor 
endowment is increased, or when wildlife are more plentiful.  The functional response is linear in 
wildlife abundance, x, which stems from Cobb-Douglas preferences and Schaefer harvesting.  In 
Section V we investigate the implications of a nonlinear response.     
Population growth (or fertility) in both societies depends on the available food supply, 
which is particularly true for people living close to subsistence (see Frisch 1978; Hansson and 
Stuart 1990; Nerlove 1991, 1993; Dasgupta 1995).  Following conventional models of predator 
populations (e.g., McGehee and Armstrong 1977), let the dynamics of the aggregate Neanderthal 
population be described by 
(6)  ) (
*
N N N m b d N N + - =  , 
                                                           
11 We also assume humans and Neanderthals maximize their own utility without considering the effects of their 
decisions on the “other” society.  This implies that neither group makes strategic decisions intended to wipe out the 
other group.  This assumption  matters because  ultimately the relative  well-being of the two  groups drives our 
results; a society aware of this situation has a strategic advantage in out-competing the other society (Kockesen et al. 
2000). At least three requirements must hold for such strategic actions to occur.  First, strategic actions require a 
‘theory of mind’—an ability to attribute states of mind to others so as to predict their actions (see Robson 2001).  
Second, a finite discount rate is required since the strategy can only be successful in the long run, possibly thousands 
of years.  Third, the group must work together to achieve a common goal—the maximization of social net benefits 




where  dN  is  the  mortality  rate,  bNmN  is  the  birth  rate,  and  mN  is  average  per  capita  meat 
consumption.  The population shrinks (grows) whenever average household meat intake falls 
short of (exceeds) a subsistence level, S.
12  The parameter bN is set equal to dN /SN , where SN 
represents the minimum quantity of food  that Neanderthals need to support themselves.  From 
expression (6), if mN/SN<1, the population growth rate is negative and the population diminishes.  
As  1 / ® N N S m ,  the  population  does  not  change.    If  1 / > N N S m ,  the  population  grows.  
Population growth for humans has an analogous specification, which is obtained by substituting 
M for N in equation (6) 
(7)  ) (
*
M M M m b d M M + - =  . 
We  modify  Neanderthal  population  growth  relative  to  (6)  to  account  for  the 
heterogeneous sub-populations, although growth of one sub-population can depend on the other.  
We assume the offspring of skilled hunters can be either skilled or unskilled; unskilled hunters 
can have either skilled or unskilled offspring.  Denote the proportion of skilled hunters’ offspring 
who are also skilled by  Ns h ; and the proportion of unskilled hunters’ offspring who are unskilled 
by  Nu h .    Heredity  is  likely  to  bias  the  distribution  of  offspring’s  skills  along  the  lines  of 
parentage, such that  5 . 0    , 5 . 0 > h > h Nu Ns .  The skilled sub-population grows according to
13 
(8) 
* * ) 1 ( ) ( Nu N Nu u Ns N Ns N s s m b N m b d N N h - + h + - =   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
humans, we abstract away from such strategic interaction.  If early humans did possess mental faculties to engage in 
strategic interaction with Neanderthals whereas Neanderthals did not, the main results of this paper are reinforced. 
12 Strauss and Duncan (1998) discuss the importance of such thresholds.  
13 This specification accounts for innate skills and does not address the possibility that those with fewer innate skills 
could learn from more-skilled hunters.  To incorporate learning would significantly complicate the model and would 
require keeping track of which skilled hunters had innate versus learned skills (Cavelli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981).  
Another issue might be the time devoted to education and learning, since the time allocation is finite.  Boyd and 
Richerson (1985, particularly chapters 4 and 6) and Cavelli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) for parent-teacher models of 
cultural transmission.   With specialization and trade, one could argue that humans had the comparative advantage in 





Growth of the unskilled sub-population is defined by switching the s and u subscripts in (8).  
Growth of the skilled and unskilled human sub-populations is also analogously defined. 
Let  ri  represent  the  proportion  of  skilled  hunters  in  population  i.    This  proportion  may 
change over time in response to fertility and mortality in each subgroup.  The evolution of  i r  is 
driven by natural selection, which is distinct from competitive exclusion. Competitive exclusion 
involves  one  distinct  population  displacing  another  population,  whereas  natural  selection 
involves changes in genetic traits within a population interacting with its environment.  Selection 
rewards traits that increase an individual’s chances of survival or fertility or both. Acting as a 
“filter” through which genes are passed from one generation to the next, natural selection will 
ultimately change the population’s composition. We define the rate of  natural selection, for 
instance in the human population, by  ) / / )( 1 ( / u u s S M M M M M M M    - - = r r r .  Natural selection 
favors skilled humans when  0 / > M M r r  ; it favors unskilled humans when  0 / < M M r r  .  The 
selection  rate  is  defined  analogously  for  Neanderthals:    selection  favors  skilled  or  unskilled 
Neanderthals when  0 / > N N r r   or  0 / < N N r r  . 
Using expression (8) along with meat consumption levels for each sub-group, the rate of 
natural selection for humans is (with an analogous rate applying to Neanderthals) 
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The relevant tradeoffs occur within the bracketed ({}) term on the right hand side of expression 
(9).    The  terms  Mj Mjq h   (j=s,u)  represent  a  sub-population’s  own-fertility  effects  – the  direct 
fertility  effects  a  sub-population  has  on  its  own  sub-population.  The  terms 
) 1 /( ) 1 ( M M Ms Mu q r r h - -   and  M M Mu Ms q r r h / ) 1 ( ) 1 ( - -   represent  the  sub-populations’  cross-




Greater own-fertility by one sub-population has a positive impact on the rate of natural selection 
for that sub-population.  The more one sub-population supplements its own kind, the greater its 
relative growth.  In contrast, greater cross-fertility by one sub-population has a negative impact 
on  the  rate  of  natural  selection  for  that  sub-population.    In  Appendix  I,  we  show  that  the 
proportion of skilled hunters,  i r , converges monotonically over time to a unique value, 
*
i r .  For 
instance,  starting  with  a  small  proportion  of  skilled  hunters,  the  proportion  increases 
monotonically over time until the steady state is reached.  Once 
*
i i r r = , the proportion of 
skilled hunters remains constant, regardless of changes in the competing homonid population or 
the prey base.   
Consider now the prey of human and Neanderthal hunters.  We combine all wildlife 
populations into a single aggregate variable x, ignoring any changes in species composition over 
time.  Wildlife growth is governed by the conventional logistic growth function 
(10)   G(x) = ax(1 – x/k), 
where a is the intrinsic growth rate and k is the carrying capacity.  Human and Neanderthal 
harvests reduce wildlife growth, and so the dynamics of the wildlife stock are described by 
(11) 
* * ) 1 ( M N Mm Nm
k
x
x x - - - a =  . 
For  this  model,  small  differences  in  one  or  more  of  the  ‘biological’  parameters 
i i i i S l q or    ,   , , b  lead to the extinction of the slightly less accomplished “predator” species (see 
Appendix I).
14  Humans survive if they have some combination of greater hunting efficiency, 
preferences  for  meat,  time  available  for  work,  or  lower  subsistence  requirements  relative  to 
                                                           
14 We have not mentioned how differences in d might affect extinction because d has a dual impact under the current 
specification (since b=d/S).  For a larger d, population growth is greater when the population is nourished, and 




Neanderthals; or vice versa.  We illustrate this with a numerical example based on a discrete 
approximation of the model and calibrated using data on megafauna harvesting from Whittington 
and Dyke (1984) (see Appendix II for specifics).  The following parameter values serve as a 
benchmark for both Neanderthals and humans: S = 2.9 animal units (AU, where 1 AU=1,000 
pounds; one grown Mammuthus imperator may equal more than 20 AUs.), d=0.08, l=7300, k=75 
million AU, a=0.15, b=0.6, qis=8.3´10
-11,  is iu q q 75 . 0 = , and the initial value of r
i = 0.2 (i=N, M).  
 
B: Numerical results 
Table  1  shows  the  results  for  cases  in  which  humans  are  more  biologically  efficient:  the 
parameters q and l are three percent larger and S is three percent smaller for humans.
15  In each 
case, assume a small group of humans enter after Neanderthals have reached an equilibrium with 
the wildlife population, which is consistent with local Neanderthal populations living for up to 
hundreds of thousands of years before humans arrived.  The results in Table 1 indicate human 
survival and Neanderthal extinction––an example of biological exclusion as discussed by many 
others and modelled, for example, by Flores (1998). 
Although  the  biological  efficiency  differential  (e.g.,  Dq)  is  arbitrarily  chosen,  the 
predicted extinction intervals correspond well with Flores’ (1998, p.295) claim that the “massive 
extinction was completed between 5,000 and 10,000 years, depending on the region.”  Pettitt 
(1999),  however,  argues  that  local  extinction  events  may  have  occurred  more  rapid—within 
about 30 generations, or some 600 years.  His elaborate discussion of the difficulties associated 
with carbon dating such brief periods does not bode well for more accurate predictions of the 
extinction interval in the future.  In what follows we therefore focus on the qualitative results and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
such as b could lead to extinction of one species.  This result would support the principle of biological exclusion, 
particularly to the extent that preferences have biological foundations (see Robson 2001).  




refrain from discussing our predicted intervals in detail since there is no reasonable context in 
which to place these numbers. 
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of the extinction process for the case in which humans 
are more efficient hunters.  The superior hunting ability of humans implies a slow displacement 
and eventual extinction of Neanderthals.  Prior to human arrival, the Neanderthal and wildlife 
populations are in equilibrium with wildlife abundance at about 9 million AU and a Neanderthal 
population of about 375,000.  In year 0, a small population of humans settles in Neanderthal 
territory.    The  human  population  grows  given  the  relative  abundance  of  wildlife.    Human 
hunting, however, causes a slight decline in the wildlife population and the diminished wildlife 
stock can no longer support the existing Neanderthal population.  Human population-growth and 
Neanderthal population-decline occur monotonically as humans replace Neanderthals.   
Recall  the  outcome  of  Neanderthal  extinction  and  human  survival  is  reversed  if  we 
assume  humans  were  biologically  less  efficient––a  possibility  one  cannot  rule  out given  the 
archaeological  evidence.    If  the  Neanderthals  were  biologically  more  efficient  (e.g.,  better 
ecologically adapted to the environment in which they survived and gained experience for many 
millennia), the model predicts humans would not have co-existed with Neanderthals for any 
significant time interval.
16  But as we demonstrate in the next section, the fact that humans 
survived  and  Neanderthals  went  extinct  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  humans  were 
biologically  more  efficient.    Instead,  we  demonstrate  that  humans  could  have  overcome 
biological inferiorities by increasing their economic efficiency through specialization of labor 
and inter-household trade. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
16 When there is a non-linear relation between predators and prey, co-existence of multiple predators (e.g., in the 





III.  A behavioral theory of exclusion  
A: The behavioral model 
We now turn to our behavioral exploration of Neanderthal extinction.  For simplicity and without 
loss, we focus on the simplest case in which humans engage in a division of labor and trade 
while Neanderthals do not, although our results would certainly hold if Neanderthals also traded, 
doing so on a smaller scale than humans.  Assume each Neanderthal household produces both 
the meat and the other goods it consumes; and consumption levels are given by the solution to 
the static optimization problem in expression (5).  We recognize that Neanderthals might have 
engaged  in  some  inter-household  food  sharing  within  their  tribe  or  group  (Kuhn  and  Stiner 
1998), as is observed in current hunter-gatherer economies that “smooth” consumption when 
hunting  megafauna  (e.g.,  Kaplan  and  Hill  1985).    Such  sharing,  however,  would  have  been 
limited to small groups – immediate family and close allies.  Moreover, food sharing need not 
have evolved towards more external trading and specialization of tasks, as supported by the 
evidence of a stationary and isolated Neanderthal culture.  Even if we allowed for the possibility 
of within-group Neanderthal trade, the gains from trading and specialization for humans trading 
within and between groups would still have been greater.   
  Assume humans organize and specialize such that they engage in inter-household trade (see 
Sahlins 1974 for an interesting anthropological account of trade, including various constraints 
among  ‘modern’  primitive  cultures).    Each  household  makes  labor  allocation  decisions  to 
maximize utility (1) subject to the budget constraint
17 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Armstrong 1977).  We examine several non-linear models in Section V and find this does not occur in our 
specifications. 
17 In general, trading could also increase the quality of goods used by some humans, which could affect q over time 
for both skilled and unskilled hunters.  For instance, humans might import better quality raw materials for tools and 
weapons, or these products may be improved through technical change stimulated by trade.  While we do not model 
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where p is the price of other goods in terms of meat.  Since the first order and market clearing 
conditions for such optimization problems are well known and straightforward, we do not derive 
them here.  Instead, Table 2 summarizes the resulting trading equilibria, which we now discuss.   
Using this Ricardian model, we find that three possible equilibria emerge depending on 
the relative scarcity of skill levels within the human population (Krugman and Obstfeld 1991; 
Chacholiades 1978).   Under Scenario A in Table 2, skilled human hunters are scarce and their 
within-group  comparative  advantage  in  hunting  (i.e.,  Mu Ms q q / )  is  relatively  small.    Skilled 
hunters only hunt, and the unskilled hunters do both—they make other goods and they hunt.  
This variation results in the same amount of meat consumption as in the no-trading equilibrium 
and a greater consumption of other goods by skilled hunters (Table 2).  Skilled hunters benefit 
from this division of labor because the relative price of the other good falls––they do not need to 
spend time to produce them.  The change in relative prices, however, does not cause them to 
consume any additional meat because of the offsetting income and cross-price effects that arise 
with a Cobb-Douglas function.  With Cobb-Douglas, if the price of the other good falls, the 
skilled hunters only consume more of the other good.  The net result  does not increase the 
fertility of humans relative to Neanderthals.
18  
Scenarios B and C tell a different story (see Table 2).  Scenario B involves complete 
                                                           
18 This result follows from our assumption that fertility is a function of meat consumption only (see O’Neill 2002).  
It might be equally valid to assume that consumption of “other goods” (shelter, etc.) also affects replenishment, i.e., 
growth of the human and Neanderthal populations might be more appropriately modeled as a function of utility 
(fitness) as opposed to just meat.  We do not pursue such an analysis here because of the difficulties associated with 
inter-personal (species) utility comparisons and because the associated nonlinearities would make it difficult to 
produce clear analytic results (McGehee and Armstrong 1977).  Were we to model population growth as a function 
of utility, our results would only be enhanced because trading would then increase population growth along two 
dimensions – meat and other goods – as opposed to the single dimension of the present model.  Finally, note that 
like the skill level in society, preferences could have been shaped by natural selection (Robson 2001, Rogers 1994, 




specialization—skilled hunters hunt; unskilled hunters produce the other goods.  Skilled hunters 
benefit because the relative price of other goods falls.  With unskilled hunters specializing in 
their comparative-advantage activity, they obtain meat at a lower cost than in Scenario A or the 
no-trade case.  Their meat consumption goes up. A similar result arises in Scenario C but for a 
different reason. Here skilled hunters produce both meat and other goods because their numbers 
are plentiful; the unskilled hunters only make other goods. The skilled hunters do not benefit 
from trade because the relative prices they face have not changed from the no-trading case.  The 
unskilled hunters do benefit, however.  Since unskilled hunters again specialize on other goods, 
the skilled hunters still devote more time to hunting and produce more meat than would be 
produced under no-trading or Scenario B.  All extra meat goes to unskilled hunters. 
In Scenarios B and C, trade has a non-negative impact on meat consumption for each 
group, with at least one group consuming more.  The net effect is an increase in the growth rate 
of  the  human  population  relative  to  Neanderthals.    We  now  explore  how  this  increased 
population growth affects natural selection, the scarcity of skill levels and the type of trading 
system that emerges, and species exclusion. 
 
B.  Natural selection, trade, and exclusion 
From Table 2, we see that the evolution of r
M —the proportion of skilled human hunters—is the 
key  variable  that  determines  which  trading  scenario  emerges  at  different  points  in  time.  As 
described above, the evolution of  M r  is driven by natural selection.  For trading Scenario A, 
natural selection occurs according to equation (9) for the no-trading outcome described above – 
driven  by  both  own-fertility  and  cross-fertility  effects.    Note  that  human  meat  consumption 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Incorporating  the  selection  of  preferences  would  require  an  additional  source  of  within-species  heterogeneity, 




patterns here are identical to the Neanderthal, which means this discussion of Scenario A also 
applies to the no-trade scenario adopted by Neanderthals.   
  With trading Scenarios B and C, additional indirect fertility effects emerge.  Consider first 
Scenario  B—the  complete  division  of  labor  scenario.    Here  the  rate  of  natural  selection 
expression analogous to expression (9) is 
(13)
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The productivity of a skilled human hunter has (i) a direct effect on the fertility of both his own 
sub-population and the unskilled hunters, and (ii) an indirect effect due to the complete division 
of  labor—meat  consumption  of  unskilled  hunters  depends  on  the  productivity  of  the  skilled 
hunters.    More  productive  skilled  hunters  relative  to  unskilled  hunters  enables  the  unskilled 
population to consume more meat and increase their fertility relative to Scenario A and the no-
trading scenario.  The indirect fertility effects positively affect the own- and cross-fertility effects 
of unskilled hunters, which benefits both sub-populations.  Assuming h
Mu> 0.5, the own-fertility 
effect of unskilled hunters dominates the cross-fertility effect.  Additional consumption of meat 
by unskilled humans relative to skilled humans implies that trading reduces the forces that drive 
natural selection.  A similar story can be told for trade Scenario C.    
In Appendix I, we show that  M r  evolves monotonically over time until an equilibrium 
value is achieved, after which point  M r  remains constant for all future periods.  An equilibrium 
emerges for only one trading scenario, although other trading scenarios can emerge en route to 
the equilibrium scenario.  In Appendix I, we also show that under Scenarios B and C the division 




in a relatively greater selection of skilled hunters within the Neanderthal population,  M N r r > . 
Trade reduces the average skill level in human society. 
  We have shown that natural selection affects the relative scarcity of skilled hunters and the 
emergent  trading  scenario,  and  that  the  trading  scenario  in  turn  affects  the  rate  of  natural 
selection.  We now define our behavioral exclusion principle between humans and Neanderthals.  
Appendix I shows this principle arises given identical biological parameters across species and 
provided that humans do not get stuck in Scenario A.  Behavioral exclusion occurs if per capita 
meat consumption of humans exceeds Neanderthal consumption, which is formally represented 
by the following condition  
(14)  0 ) ( ) )( 1 ( ) (
* * * * * * > D - W = - d - - r - + - r Nu Ns Nu Mu M Ns Ms M m m m m m m  
where  M N r - r = d ,  ) )( 1 ( ) (
* * * *
Nu Mu M Ns Ms M m m m m - r - + - r = W ,  and  ) (
* *
Nu Ns m m - d = D .    The 
term  W  represents  how  gains  from  trade  affect  increased  per  capita  meat  consumption  and 
exclusion, holding natural selection constant.  The term D offsets exclusion since d>0 due to the 
greater natural selection of skilled hunters within the Neanderthal population ( M N r > r ). 
In Scenarios  B and C, humans exclude Neanderthals because human per capita meat 
consumption is greater due to the division of labor.  Skilled humans consume the same amount 
of  meat  as  their  Neanderthal  counterparts  while  unskilled  humans  consume  more,  such  that 
) )( 1 (
* *
Nu Mu M m m - r - = W >0.    Natural  selection  within  the  Neanderthal  population,  however, 
partially offsets the gains from the division of human labor since D < 0.
19  This is because a 
larger value of  N r  relative to  M r  reduces the per  capita meat consumption  advantage that 




long as all biological parameters are identical across the species (see Appendix I) – exclusion 
just  takes  longer  than  if  natural  selection  was  not  a  factor.    But  if  biological  factors  did 
significantly favor Neanderthals, this natural selection effect (D < 0) could make Neanderthal 
exclusion less likely, or even trigger the exclusion of humans.   
Below  we  illustrate  the  behavioral  exclusion  principal  numerically.    The  benchmark 
parameter values are adopted..
20 Tables 3 and 4 report the results for various combinations of 
values for  is h  and  iu h  (i=N, M), maintaining  Ns Ms h h =  and  Nu Mu h h =  such that trade is the only 
factor influencing exclusion. 
 
C: Numerical results with equal biological efficiency 
Table  3  presents  the  simulation  results  assuming  equal  biological  efficiency  of  humans  and 
Neanderthals.   The results confirm our expectations.  With no biological differences, trading 
humans survive and non-trading Neanderthals go extinct, provided  s h is not too small and  u h is 
not too large relative to  s h ; otherwise trading Scenario A emerges and co-existence results.  
Comparing  fertility  scenarios  1  and  2  shows  how  the  division-of-labor  boosts  the  power  of 
behavioral exclusion.   A 25 percent reduction in  iu h  (i = M, N) cuts the Neanderthal extinction 
time  by  more  than  half.    Although  both  populations  experience  greater  selection  of  skilled 
hunters relative to fertility scenario 1, the shorter extinction time occurs despite greater selection 
of skilled Neanderthal hunters (i.e.,  M N r > r ).  The difference must be due to trading.  The 
reduced relative scarcity of skilled human hunters allows humans to attain trading Scenario C, in 
which unskilled hunters consume even more meat, while skilled hunters do not consume any 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
19 Among Neanderthals, food sharing that is unaccompanied by a division of labor would not increase per capita 
meat consumption, but it would decrease the natural selection of skilled Neanderthals since they would eat less 




less.  Natural selection of skilled hunters has a greater impact when a division of labor exists.
21 
  The  behavioral  exclusion  process  is  virtually  identical  to  the  biological  exclusion 
process in Figure 1, except for the time frame.  In year 0, Neanderthals are in equilibrium with 
6 . 0 = N r   (a  proportion  maintained  throughout  the  exclusion  process).    Humans  enter 
Neanderthal  territory  with  2 . 0 = rM .    Humans  begin  trading  according  to  Scenario  A  since 
skilled human hunters are scarce.  But over time skilled hunters become less scarce.  After 56 
years, natural selection has increased the proportion of skilled human hunters to  53 . 0 = M r  to 
allow for a complete division of labor.  Humans retain this division of labor until Neanderthals 
go  extinct,  with  M r   increasing  to  0.56  over  the  following  180  years.    Even  with  a  higher 
proportion  of  skilled  hunters,  Neanderthals  cannot  compete  against  the  humans’  economic 
system.   
 
C.  Results with unequal biological efficiency 
What if the Neanderthals were more biologically efficient than humans?   Table 4 shows that 
conditions exist such that economic efficiency can overcome this biological advantage.  Suppose 
the catchability coefficient, q, is 5 percent larger than the value used in Table 3, for both skilled 
and unskilled Neanderthals.  Under fertility scenario 1, human division of labor is insufficient to 
overcome the greater biological efficiency of Neanderthals.  Humans can only withstand up to a 
3 percent differential.  This value increases to 7 percent under fertility scenario 2.  The results are 
identical for a larger l or a larger b (and similar for a smaller S) by Neanderthals because each of 
these parameters has the same marginal impact on Neanderthal meat consumption. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
20 The choice of r




The  results  are  markedly  different  when  we  consider  fertility  differences  between 
Neanderthals  and  humans  in  Table  4.    Increased  Neanderthal  fertility  rates  favoring  skilled 
hunters  generally have  only a small effect on  offsetting behavioral exclusion.  For instance, 
under  human  fertility  scenario  2,  even  runaway  natural  selection  within  the  Neanderthal 
population  is  inadequate  to  overcome  greater  human  economic  efficiency.    A  homogeneous 
group  of  skilled  Neanderthals  would  have  to  exist  to  overcome  behavioral  exclusion,  which 
seems unlikely based on available evidence. 
V.  Alternative specifications 
In Table 3, we explored how different assumptions about fertility rates affected the basic results.  
We now consider five alternative parameter specifications that could also affect the results:  the 
environmental carrying  capacity of wildlife,  which impacts human  and Neanderthal  carrying 
capacities and roughly corresponds to the available land area under consideration; the intrinsic 
growth rate of wildlife; the degree of comparative advantage held by skilled hunters ( u s q q / ); 
the elasticity of substitution of goods in the utility function; and congestion externalities on the 
hunting grounds.
 22  Table 5 reports the results using fertility scenario 1 from Table 3 as the base 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
21 Comparison of fertility scenarios 1 and 3 shows a 25 percent reduction in  is h  (i = M, N) pushes natural selection 
in the opposite direction.  The scarcity of skilled humans is increased and trading Scenario A results.  Per capita 
meat consumption is identical across species and the species co-exist. 
22 Another possible extension, which we do not consider, concerns the relation between nutrition and productivity.  
Hunting megafauna relies on strength and endurance, which depends on good health and nutrition.  Caloric intake is 
associated with increases in maximum oxygen intake, and therefore with fitness (e.g., Dasgupta 1993, Strauss and 
Duncan 1998).  Even if qj (j = s, u) was the same across species, one could assume “effective productivity” might be 
greater in one species due to better nutrition.  Capturing this idea is beyond our current scope, in part because the 
number of sub-groups would grow too rapidly over time to monitor (e.g., a skilled hunter having unskilled parents 
may have a different nutritional status than a skilled hunter having skilled parents, etc.).  One can speculate as to 
how this extension might affect our general results.  Increased meat consumption may cause skilled humans to 
develop both a productivity and fertility advantage relative to skilled and unskilled Neanderthal hunters.  These 
effects could be reinforcing over time.  In contrast, Neanderthal fertility and nutrition, and productivity might be 
diminished in subsequent periods as the combination of human and Neanderthal harvests reduce the wildlife stock.  
The  relatively  greater  nourishment  and  productivity  of  humans,  combined  with  the  lack  of  nourishment  and 
productivity of Neanderthals, effectively increases the relative biological efficiency of humans.  Positive feedbacks 




model of comparison. 
  First, suppose we reduce the environmental carrying capacity, k, by 50 percent.   Table 5 
shows this reduction has almost no effect on the time to Neanderthal extinction, and no effect on 
the type of trading equilibrium or on natural selection.  This result is at least consistent with 
Pettitt’s (1999) findings that periods of human/Neanderthal co-existence may be similar even in 
regions  that  vary  greatly  in  size.    Similar  results  hold  in  the  second  scenario,  in  which  the 
intrinsic  growth  rate  of  the  wildlife  stock  is  reduced  by  50  percent.    Under  these  first  two 
scenarios, smaller equilibrium predator and prey stocks emerge.  Exclusion time is not greatly 
affected, however: human harvests and fertility are smaller since human harvests depend on a 
smaller wildlife stock, but there are fewer Neanderthals to replace. 
Next suppose skilled humans and Neanderthals  have a 50 percent larger comparative 
advantage  to  unskilled  individuals.    Table  5  shows  that  more  comparative  advantage  cuts 
Neanderthal extinction time by almost 70 percent. The shorter time frame arises even though 
natural selection of skilled hunters for the Neanderthal population has increased significantly.  
Also the increased comparative advantage has not influenced natural selection within the human 
population––from expression (13), comparative advantage does not influence natural selection 
because skilled hunters supply all of the meat and their skill level, qs, has an identical marginal 
impact on own- and cross-fertility effects of skilled and unskilled hunters. 
  Fourth, we examine differences in the elasticity of substitution between goods in the utility 
function,  denoted  s.    Consider  the  CES  utility  function 
i i i
ij i ij i ij v m U
q q q b b
/ 1 ) ) 1 ( ( - + = ,  where 
i i i s s q / ) 1 ( - = .  Cobb-Douglas utility is a special case of CES utility in which s=1.  One 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
trade-induced  superior  economic  efficiency  (see  Strauss  and  Duncan,  1998).    These  feedback  loops  may  also 





consequence of the s=1 restriction is the canceling out of the income and cross-price effects 
associated with a decrease in the price of other goods (v).  The result is skilled humans always 
consume the same amount of meat as they would in the no-trade scenario (see Table 2).  A 
second consequence is the meat consumption function is linear in the resource stock.   
Since both consequences vanish when s¹1, we now let s equal a value other than unity.     
For instance, optimal meat consumption under the no-trading equilibrium (or trading Scenario A) 




























The relation is more complex under trading Scenarios B and C.  
If s<1, the goods are net complements.  When humans gain from trade, the income and 
substitution  effects  no  longer  cancel  and  individuals  adjust  their  consumption  package  in 
response to changing relative prices.  Depending on the trade scenario that emerges, this suggests 
skilled humans consume more meat (Scenarios A and B) than they would in the Cobb-Douglas 
case,  and  the  natural  selection  of  skilled  humans  is  also  increased.    Trading  also  increases 
unskilled humans’ meat consumption in Scenarios B and C, although the increase is smaller than 
in the Cobb-Douglas case.  Trading humans therefore always consume more meat than non-
trading Neanderthals, and the final result must be our survival and their demise.  Assuming 
s=0.8 for the numerical simulation, Scenario A emerges. Unlike Scenario A from Table 2 we 
now  find  that  skilled  hunters  consume  more  meat  than  skilled  Neanderthals,  resulting  in  a 
gradual process of displacement. 
If s>1, the goods are net substitutes.  Depending on the trade scenario that emerges, this 




consume more meat (Scenarios B and C) than they would in the Cobb-Douglas case.  Compared 
to the Cobb-Douglas case, biological exclusion proceeds quickly when trading humans end up in 
Scenario C: skilled humans consume no less meat and unskilled persons consume even more 
meat  than  before.    In  contrast,  humans  get  excluded  when  human  society  gets  trapped  in 
Scenario A.  Here, per capita meat consumption decreases as skilled humans consume less and 
unskilled humans consume the same as non-trading Neanderthals, implying humans do not gain 
the  necessary  foothold.    Finally,  in  Scenario  B  it  is  a  priori  unclear  whether  humans  or 
Neanderthals will prevail – unskilled humans consume more and skilled humans consume less.  
Average meat consumption is ambiguously impacted.  Regardless of the scenario, however, the 
depressing effect of trade on the average skill level is more pronounced – the equilibrium value 
of  M r   is  lower  than  with  Cobb-Douglas  utility.    We  have  performed  extensive  numerical 
analyses  to  explore  the  consequences  of  CES  utility  with  substitute  goods,  and  found  that 
humans always exclude Neanderthals for the realistic parameter combinations we consider (i.e., 
Scenario A never arises).  Scenario B only arises when  01 . 1 £ s , but even then Neanderthals are 
excluded.  The result in Table 5 describes what occurs if s=1.2, in which human society ends up 
in Scenario C.  The result is rapid displacement of Neanderthals. 
Finally,  consider  the  impact  of  congestion  externalities  on  the  hunting  grounds.    In 
general, congestion externalities can arise from both intra-specific and inter-specific competition 
for animals.  Hunting congestion typically enters the problem through the harvest function in the 
form  of  diminishing  returns  to  effort  (e.g.,  Clark  1990).    We  use  the  following  form  for 





sM MM kM Mj kM e z e z x e q h
-
¹ å å + = ) ( , where rÎ(0,1) is 




j  (i,  j=M,N);  0 = ij z   otherwise.    This  form  allows  for  both  intra-specific  and  inter-specific 
competition.   We define the harvest function for Neanderthals analogously.   
The  key  questions  are:  does  hunting  congestion  affect  human  populations  more  than 
Neanderthals, and what are the implications for exclusion?  For non-trading hunters and given 
Cobb-Douglas utility, it is straightforward to show that meat consumption is inversely related to 
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case.  The relations arising in our trading equilibria are qualitatively similar in this regard.  We 
investigate the impact of congestion externalities numerically, assuming  1 = ii z  and  1 < ij z  (i, 
j=M,N) in accordance with the view that intra-specific competition created larger congestion 
externalities  than  inter-specific  competition  (e.g.,  because  humans  and  Neanderthals  did  not 
cross paths too much).  Table 5 presents the results for several parameter combinations.   The 
results suggest that externalities tend to delay exclusion, although Neanderthals still eventually 
go  extinct.      We  do  find,  however,  some  extreme  cases  (not  reported)  in  which  extremely 
prolonged co-existence might result.  Two factors drive these extreme cases: (1) humans have 
more difficulty establishing themselves when confronted by Neanderthal-created externalities; 
and (2) if zij<1, as Neanderthal populations fall, Neanderthals face smaller congestion problems 
within their own population, which in turn reduces the pace of exclusion.
23 
 
V.  Concluding remarks  
Stephen Jay Gould once argued that the current dominant position of Homo sapiens on this 
planet is not the inevitable outcome of a purposeful evolutionary process.   Rather, our rise to 
                                                           
23 In contrast, when we ignore inter-specific competition there are also cases where congestion accentuates our main 
results (for high or intermediate densities of both humans and Neanderthals).  Trading and specialization may reduce 




power  depended  on  an  exceeding  number  of  exogenous  factors  including  the  Cambrium 
explosion, comet and meteor hits and the demise of dinosaurs, leading Gould to conclude that we 
are a “wildly improbable evolutionary event” (Gould 1989, p.381).  If we rewind the tape of 
history and run it again, he wrote, the chance of human domination is exceedingly small.  This 
paper demonstrates that the fate of humanity may have been even more uncertain––even on the 
current and improbable trajectory leading to human domination, interaction with contemporary 
rivals some 40,000 years ago could have been fatal to humanity.  We did not enter a vacant niche 
in ecological system––we had to conquer it. 
But just how did we conquer and rise to dominance?  Many theories attempt to explain 
the rise of humanity in Eurasia and the associated Neanderthal extinction in terms of biology or 
aggression.  Although no single theory is likely to be a Panacea and nobody really knows which 
theories,  if  any,  are  correct,  a  significant  limitation  of  existing  theories  is  that  they  tend  to 
abstract away from behavioral responses to economic stimuli.  Economic forces have played 
integral roles in shaping societies throughout recorded human history, and there is no reason to 
discount either the presence or potential impact of economics in the pre-historic dawning of 
humanity.
24  Economics might have been the only thing going for us in those early days – even 
though these forces may have to some extent conflicted with biological forces.  We conclude that 
humans  would  always  prevail  if  humans  and  Neanderthals  were  about  equally  capable  and 
humans ‘invented’ the appropriate economic institutions.  Humans could have conquered their 
niche even if the incumbent party was somewhat stronger or better adjusted to its environment.  
Based on these findings, we conclude that a behavioral basis and endogenous choices may exist 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
production of other goods), enhancing their ability to outperform Neanderthals.  Trade can thus make a non-linear 
response function “more linear.”  We would like to thank a referee for pointing this out. 
24 For example, an alternative economic theory of Neanderthal extinction may be based on Diamond’s observation 




for the eventual rise of human domination, although we should emphasize that there was nothing 
inevitable  about  it.    We  believe  the  behavioral  model  strengthens  Gould’s  claim  that  our 
existence is improbable. 
A crucial issue remains unresolved––it is an open question why the early humans first 
realized the competitive edge from trade.  Some attribute this edge to differences in cognition or 
language abilities or both, but the jury is still out (Tattersall and Schwartz 2000; Mithen 1990).  
While this may seem to lead back to biology, genetic differences do not necessarily make an 
individual more competitive in the acquisition of resources.  Rather these biological differences 
facilitate group interaction, which in turn brings more success to the group as a whole.  A natural 
starting place to address the origin of rich social structures involving trade in future work is to 
examine  the  two  competing  theories  that  explain  the  development  of  rationality:  social 
intelligence theory –– strategic interaction with other humans was the key to evolving rationality, 
in  which  longevity  and  rationality  go  hand  in  hand  (see  Robson  2001);  and  ecological 
intelligence theory –– interactions with the environment triggered the development of rationality.  
The ecological theory gives rise to a tantalizing possibility.  Akin to findings in the “induced 
innovation” literature, humans may have had more incentives to “invest in rationality” (Robson 
2001) if their level of biological efficiency was low.  Obviously this development of rationality 
took place before humans entered the Eurasian battleground studied here.   If this was the case 
and if trading emerged as a solution, their relatively biological inefficiency effectively stimulated 
trade. Here the differences between our behavioral model and models of biological exclusion are 
even starker: it might have been their biological inefficiency that stimulated efforts to make 
humans more economically efficient and that saved them.  Exploring whether the ecological 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
accumulation  of  knowledge  is  based  on  one  generation  teaching  the  next,  so  that  longevity  facilitates  the 
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Appendix I:  Propositions and Proofs 
To conserve space, we simultaneously develop propositions and proofs related to both the 
biological model of section II and the trading model of section III.   The trading Scenario A of 
section III is equivalent to the biological outcome in section II.   
Proposition 1:  Consider the model of section II, only with homogenous populations (i.e., 
0 = iu h  (i=M,N).  In this model, small differences in one or more of the biological parameters 
leads to the extinction of the less-accomplished predator species. 
Proof:  Without loss of generality, we assume humans are biologically more efficient, and we 
focus on the biological parameters  i q  and  i S [from expression (5), a larger value of either 
i i i l q b or    , ,  has the same effect on meat consumption].   
Case 1:  N M q q > .  Suppose  N M l l = ,  N M S S =  and  N M b = b , while  N M q q > .  Given that 
M N S S = , equations (6) and (7) imply that a steady state involving both humans and 
Neanderthals only arises when 
* *
M M M M N N N N m x l q x l q m = b = b = .  This condition, however, is not 
satisfied when  N M q q > ; instead, 
* *
M N m m < .  Using equations (6) and (7) along with 
* *
M N m m < , 
we find that the following condition must hold  
(A1)  0 ] [ / /
* * < - = - M N m m b M M N N    
This condition is consistent with four possibilities: (i) N and M both increase over time, with M 
increasing at a faster proportional rate, (ii) N and M both decrease over time, with N decreasing 
at a faster proportional rate, (iii) N decreases over time while M increases over time, and (iv) a 
cyclical pattern involving possibilities (i)-(iii) develops.   
With x being a limiting factor on the growth of both N and M, possibility (i) cannot be 
sustained.  Next consider possibility (ii).  With N and M both decreasing at each point in time, 
one species eventually goes extinct.  Here condition (A1) is only satisfied when N®0.  Likewise, 
possibility (iii) degenerates to N extinction.  Finally, one can show that a cyclical path does not 
exist (McGehee and Armstrong 1977).  We refer the reader to McGehee and Armstrong (1977) 
for a formal proof as the topological dynamics needed to rule out a cyclical path are beyond the 
scope of the present paper. 
   Case 2:  M N S S > .  Now suppose  N M q q = , but that  M N S S >  (i.e., humans are biologically 




humans here implies that  M M S m =
*  and  N N S m =
* .  Given that 
* *
M M M M N N N N m x l q x l q m = b = b = , 
this condition requires that  M N S S = .  But this condition is not satisfied since  M N S S > ; a steady 
state involving both species will not arise.  Using equations (6) and (7) and given that  M N S S > , 
the following condition must hold 
(A2)  0 ] / 1 / 1 [ / /
* < - = - M N S S dm M M N N    
The remainder of the proof is identical to arguments presented in Case 1. 
 
Proposition 2.  In any no-trading equilibrium, (i) a unique equilibrium value of  i r  exists, 
denoted 
*
i r , and (ii) 
*
i r  is globally stable (i=M,N). 
Proof.  We present the case i=N but note the results also hold for i=M.  The rate of natural 
selection in the no-trading scenario is given by equation (9).  From (9), an equilibrium (steady 
state) for  N r  occurs when either  1 = N r  or when the following condition holds 




















h h h  
Since  1 = N r  is impossible when  1 < Nj h  (j=s,u), an equilibrium can only occur when condition 
(A3) is satisfied.  Denote the first bracketed term ([]) on the LHS of (A3) by c and the second 
bracketed ([]) term by x( N r ), which is strictly increasing in  N r .  Note that x(1)> c, and x(0)<c.  
By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique value  ) 1 , 0 (
* Î N r  such that x(
*
N r ) = c.  
This proves part (i).   
Condition (A3) does not depend on any variables that change over time, other than  N r .  
Once 
*
N r  is attained, condition (A3) holds for all time and thus  0 = N r   "t, regardless of 
whether other variables have attained their steady state values.  The final thing to prove for part 
(ii) is that 
*
N r  is an attractor.  The sign of  N N r r /   depends on the sign of the LHS of (A3).  
Since x( N r ) is monotonically increasing in  M r ,  N N r r /  <0 when 
*
N N r r > , and  N N r r /  >0 
when 
*
N N r r < .  The equilibrium is stable and (ii) holds.   
Finally, since condition (A3) also applies to trading Scenario A for humans, an 
equilibrium value of  M r , denoted 
A
M r , equals 
*






N r  does not imply that humans can achieve 
A
M r .  The value 
A
M r  which solves (A3) may 
lie anywhere within the unit interval.  As  M r  increases towards 
A
M r , skilled hunters become less 
scarce and the trading scenario might change to Scenario B or Scenario C before 
A
M r is achieved.  
Under Scenarios B or C, condition (A3) is no longer the relevant condition for determining the 
equilibrium value of  M r . 
 
Proposition 3.  An equilibrium value of  M r  exists for only one trading scenario, and this 
equilibrium is globally stable.  Moreover, for trading scenarios B and C, the equilibrium value of 
M r  is less than 
*
N r . 
Proof.  Denote the equilibrium value of  M r  under trading scenario y (y=A, B, C) by 
y
M r .  Note 
M r  may be in an equilibrium (steady state), while other state variables are not.  The proof 
proceeds in three steps:  (i) show that 
y
M r  is unique and locally stable within trading Scenario y, 
provided 
y
M r  exists  (i.e., 
y
M M r = r  while trading scenario y is still in effect), (ii) show the 
existence of an equilibrium under one trading scenario rules out an equilibrium for  M r  in all 
other scenarios, and (iii) show a unique equilibrium value of  M r  must exist for one trading 
scenario and this value is globally stable. 
  (i).  Suppose 
A
M r  exists within the context of Scenario A.  In the proof to Proposition 2, we 
showed this value is unique and locally stable.  Suppose 
B
M r  exists within the context of 
Scenario B.  The rate of natural selection in Scenario B is given by equation (13).  From (13), an 
equilibrium occurs when either  1 = M r  or when the following condition holds  
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Since  1 = M r  is impossible when  1 < Mj h  (j=s,u), an equilibrium can only occur when condition 
(A4) is satisfied.  Solving (A4), we find  
(A5)  1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( < - - - - = - - + = Mu Ms Mu Ms
B
M h b b h b h bh r  
The proof of local stability is similar to the proof presented for Proposition 2 – it relies on the 
fact that the derivative of the LHS of (A4) with respect to  M r  is negative, as is the case with the 






M M r = r  so that (A4) is satisfied, condition (A4) remains satisfied and thus  0 = rM   "t 
regardless of whether other variables have achieved their steady state values.  An analogous 
proof can also be developed to show that 
C
M r  is unique and locally stable.  
(ii) From Table 2 (Required Conditions column), it is straightforward to see that Scenario 
A arises for the smallest values of  M r , and as  M r is increased the trading system changes first to 
Scenario B and then to Scenario C for sufficiently large values of  M r .   The only way an 
equilibrium value of  M r  can emerge under multiple scenarios is for the equilibrium value of  
M r  in Scenario A to be less than the equilibrium value of  M r  arising in Scenario B, which in 






M r r r < <  (given fixed  Mu Ms q q , , and  M b ).  Consider the possibility an equilibrium could 




M r r < .  We now determine if this 
















where t > 0.  Using (A6), (A4) and (A3) along with the definitions for c and  ) ( M r x  from 
Proposition 2, we have the following condition 
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M r r >  (and 
B
M N r r >
* ) – a contradiction.  The existence of an equilibrium in 
Scenario B implies no equilibrium in Scenario A, and vice versa.  An almost identical proof 
shows that the existence of an equilibrium in Scenario C implies no equilibrium in Scenario A, 
and vice versa (and also that 
C
M N r r >
* ).  
Now consider Scenarios B and C, and suppose that an equilibrium exists under each 
scenario.  The existence of an equilibrium in Scenario B requires that  b r <
B
M .  Using condition 


















For an equilibrium to occur under Scenario C, the following condition, which is analogous to 
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Since  b r >
C




M , we can use condition (A8) and (A9) to 
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Simplifying (A10), we find that this inequality reduces to the condition 




M , which is a contradiction.  The existence of an 
equilibrium in Scenario B implies no equilibrium in Scenario C, and vice versa.  
  (iii).  If an equilibrium value of  M r  does not exist under a particular trading scenario, then 
by the discussion above we know that  M r  must monotonically increase or decrease until another 
trading scenario emerges or until  1 = rM  or  0 = rM .  But  1 = rM  and  0 = rM  are not 
equilibrium options.  There must be an interior equilibrium for one of the scenarios, and only one 
since the existence of multiple equilibria is ruled out by part (ii) of this proof.  Moreover, 
because that equilibrium is locally stable and because it is also approached from other trading 
scenarios, the equilibrium must be globally stable. 
 
Lemma 1.  If  M r  is initially less than its equilibrium value,  M r  will attain its equilibrium value 
even if humans are going extinct. 
Proof.  Propositions 2 and 3 showed that  0 ) / / )( 1 ( / > - r - = r r u u s s M M M M M M M     whenever 
M r  is less than its equilibrium value.  If humans go extinct without  M r  achieving its equilibrium 
value, then  0 , 0 < < u s M M    and  ) / ( ) / ( u u s s M M M M   - < - .  This condition requires that 
0 ® u M  faster than  s M , and so  ¥ ® r r M M /  .  Since  1 < rM , the equilibrium value of  M r  will 
be achieved before extinction occurs. 
 
Proposition 4.  (i) Competitive exclusion of Neanderthals results when humans trade and 




Neanderthals of the same skill class and that humans do not get stuck in trading-scenario A.  If 
humans are trapped in trading-scenario A (or no-trading), co-existence results when there are no 
biological differences.  (ii) However, small differences in one or more of the biological 
parameters leads to the extinction of the less-accomplished predator species when neither species 
trades (or when humans are trapped in trading-scenario A). 
Proof.  (i) A species’ sub-population cannot go extinct without the entire species going extinct 
due to the fertility linkages between sub-populations.  We can examine behavioral exclusion by 
focusing on growth of the total population of each species, removing subscripts for biological 
parameters since they are assumed identical across species.  Proportional growth of the total 
human population is given by  
(A11)  u u M s s M M M M M M M / ) 1 ( / /    r - + r =   
Similarly, aggregate growth of Neanderthals is given by 





























N       
- d + r - + r = d - r - + d + r =  
where  M N r - r = d .    Assuming 
*
N N r = r   prior  to  human  arrival,  then 
0 ) / / )( 1 ( / = - r - = r r u u s s N N N N N N N    , and so the final term on the RHS of (A12) vanishes 
and  s s N N N N / /   = .   
The equilibrium value of  M r will be achieved even if Neanderthals are initially excluding 
humans by Lemma 1; by Propositions 2 and 3 the equilibrium will be achieved if the human 
population  is  growing.    Assuming  an  equilibrium  value  of  M r   is  achieved,  then 

































h - = - = -
   
    y = A, B, C 
The expression in (A13) is strictly positive for y = B, C since 
* *
Nu Mu m m >  under these scenarios 




M r < r  for y = B, C by Proposition 3.  From (A11) and (A12), we can write 
(A13) more generally as 
(A14)     ] [
* *













M m is average household meat production by humans and 
*
N m  is average household meat 
production by Neanderthals.  Conditions (A13) and (A14) therefore indicate that if humans trade 
according to Scenarios B or C that eventually their per capita meat consumption will exceed that 
of Neanderthals.  Assuming humans achieve trading Scenarios B or C, the proof of Neanderthal 
extinction follows Proposition 1.   
  Finally, if humans do get stuck in scenario A, (A14) is satisfied as an equality.  Per capita 
meat consumption is eventually identical among the species and co-existence ensues. 
(ii) Suppose neither species trades (Section II).  If   Nj Mj q q >  (j=s,u), with all other biological 
parameters equivalent between the two species, then 
* *
Nu Mu m m > .  If it is also true that 
* *
N M r r £ , 
then equation (A13) is positive and it follows from part (i) that Neanderthals are excluded.  If 
* *
N M r r >  and  Nj Mj q q >  (j=s,u), ceteris paribus, then a greater proportion of the human 
population is skilled, with both skilled and unskilled humans consuming more meat.  The result 
is greater per capita meat consumption by humans and equation (A14) is positive.  Again, it 
follows from part (i) that Neanderthals are excluded.  Finally, if  M N S S > , with all other 
biological parameters equivalent between the two species, then from equation (9) it is easily 
shown that 
* *
N M r r =  and per capita meat consumption is the same.  Equations (A13) and (A14) 
are not valid in this case though, since they are developed assuming  M N b b = .  Rather, case 2 of 
Proposition 1 applies (although with 
*
i m  equal to average household meat consumption for 




Appendix II: Parameters for the simulation model. 
We have tried to choose parameter values to make the model as realistic as possible.  While there 
is  obviously  no  good  data  from  30,000  to  40,000  years  ago,  this  is  not  a  concern  for  our 
qualitative results.  Our results emerge for any reasonable parameter set in which the types of 
differences between human and Neanderthal parameter values are qualitatively similar to the 
choices in this paper. 
 
Modeling wildlife (megafauna): The carrying capacity for megafauna is based on evidence on 
contemporary African megafauna.  Mosimann and Martin, studying megafauna hunting in North 
America, use a megafauna density of 25 animal units (AU) per square mile which.  Assuming an 
available range of 3 million square miles, this translates into k=75 million AU.  1 AU measures 
1,000 pounds of living animal.  Assume the intrinsic growth rate of megafauna is 15%; a number 
somewhat  lower  than  the  optimistic  number  (25%)  reported  by  Mosimann  and  Martin  for 
mammoths, but higher than estimates of the growth rate of modern elephants (close to 7%). 
 
Modeling human and Neanderthal population and behavior: We assume an initial population of 
100 households.  The mortality rate is d =0.08.  Over the past 200 years, U.S. mortality rates 
have  fallen  from  about  0.04  to  less  than  0.01.    We  therefore  view  our  chosen  value  for 
approximately 30,000 - 40,000 years ago to be somewhat conservative.  We assume a prehistoric 
working day for the representative household (man, woman and two kids) consists of about 20 
hours per day (7300 hours per year), and that meat is the predominant source of food so that 
b=0.6.  Finally, Dasgupta (1993) estimates that active humans should consume 2000 calories per 
day (0.73 AU/year) to sustain themselves, thus S=2.9 AU/year for our representative household. 
 
Modeling harvesting of megafauna: Mosimann and Martin assume that a single full-time hunter 
supports an entire family and harvests 13 AU per year for a wildlife density of 25 AU per square 
mile (i.e., x=75 million).  Assuming the standard Schaefer production function y=qex, and that a 
full-time hunter goes out for 10 hours a day, we find that q = 4.7´10
–11.  Next, according to 
Mosimann and Martin, if megafauna density falls to 5 AU per square mile (so that x=15 million), 
it is assumed that the annual harvest is reduced to 6.5 AU.  Again, solving for the catchability 
coefficient we find that q = 1.2´10
-10.  As a benchmark parameter in our simulations, we apply 





Table 1.  The principle of biological exclusion 
 
Scenarios in which humans  
are more biologically efficient 
 
Time from introduction of humans  
to Neanderthal extinction (years) 
qMj=1.03qNj    (j=s,u)   8,861 
lM=1.03lN  8,861 
bM=1.03bN  8,861 
SM=0.97SN  8,828 
Note:  In each scenario, all parameters are the same among humans and Neanderthals of like skill classes, with the 
exception of the parameters indicated.Table 2.  Trading equilibria 





















Mu v ) 
A.  Skilled hunters 
hunt; unskilled 
hunters hunt and 
produce other goods 
M M r > b , 
) 1 /( ) / ) 1 (( / M M M M Mu Ms q q b - b r r - <  
x l q M Ms M b  
M Mu Ms M l q q ) / )( 1 ( b -   x l q M Mu M b   M M l ) 1 ( b -  
B.  Complete division 
of labor: skilled 
hunters hunt; 
unskilled hunters 
produce other goods 
M M r > b , 
) 1 /( ) / ) 1 (( / M M M M Mu Ms q q b - b r r - >  
x l q M Ms M b   M M M Ml r r - b / ) 1 (   ) 1 /( ) 1 ( M M Ms M M x q l r - r b -   M M l ) 1 ( b -  
C.  Skilled hunters 
hunt and produce 
other goods; 
unskilled hunters 
only produce other 
goods 
M M r £ b   x l q M Ms M b   M M l ) 1 ( b -   x l q M Ms M b   M M l ) 1 ( b -  
Note: These equilibria are not steady states.  Instead, they are the solutions to the static market equilibrium problems faced by humans at each point in time.  
Table 3.  A principle of behavioral exclusion: no biological differences 
Fertility scenarios  Time from human arrival 





M r   
Equilibrium 
N r  
1. 
Ms h  = 0.8 
Mu h = 0.8 
 
7,464  B  0.56  0.60 
2. 
Ms h  = 0.8 
Mu h  = 0.6 
 
3,518  C  0.67  0.70 
3. 
Ms h  = 0.6 
Mu h = 0.8 








Table 4.  Behavioral exclusion when Neanderthals are more biologically efficient 
Parameters for which Neanderthals are more efficient  Fertility scenarios 
Ns q ,  Nu q   N l   N S   Ns h   Nu h  
1. 
Ms h  = 0.8 



















Ms h  = 0.8 












Note: Table entries represent the time (in years) from human arrival to Neanderthal extinction when parameter w is 
more efficient by y=0.05, i.e.,  M N w y w ) 1 ( + =  for w = q, l, and  s h  and  M N w y w ) 1 ( - =  for w = S and  u h .  





Table 5.  Comparative statics:  results under alternative parameter specifications 
Alternative scenarios  Time from human arrival 





M r   
Equilibrium 
N r  
1.  k is reduced by 
50% 
 
7,368  B  0.56  0.60 
2.  r is reduced by 
50% 
 
6,988  B  0.56  0.6 
3.  Comparative 
advantage ratio 




2,797  B  0.56  0.73 
4a.  The elasticity of 
substitution (s) 
is decreased by 
20% 
 
30,020  A  0.6  0.6 
4b.  The elasticity of 
substitution (s) 
is increased by 
20%. 
 
2,464  C  0.5  0.61 
5a.  Congestion 
externalities 
(r=0.001,  
zMN= zNM =0.05) 
7,628  B  0.56  0.60 
5b.  Congestion 
externalities 
(r=0.005,  
zMN= zNM =0.05) 
9,318  B  0.56  0.60 
5c.  Congestion 
externalities 
(r=0.001,  
zMN= zNM =0.9) 
7,549  B  0.56  0.60 
Note: For each scenario, all parameters values are as defined in fertility scenario 1 in Table 3, except for those 
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